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NOTES
Invasion of the Jury's Province: May the Court Determine
Damages? Shamblin's Ready Mix, Inc. v. Eaton Corp.
In a conversion suit, the jury awards punitive damages that are almost two
hundred times the compensatory damages awarded. The court of appeals af-
firms the compensatory award, but because it finds the punitive award excessive,
remands for a new trial on the punitive damages amount. On remand a second
jury returns an even higher punitive award. When the case reaches the appellate
court for the second time, the court again sets aside the punitive award as exces-
sive. After two excessive jury verdicts, what options are then within the author-
ity of the appellate court?
In Shamblin's Ready Mix, Inc. v. Eaton Corp. I the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that a litigant has no right to a jury
determination of the amount of punitive damages.2 Rather than remand for a
third jury determination, the court of appeals itself assessed the measure of puni-
tive damages. Relying upon Tull v. United States,3 the Shamblin's court held
that the amount of punitive damages is not a fundamental element of a jury trial
and that the seventh amendment does not extend to the phase of a trial in which
damages are assessed.4
This Note explores the constitutionality of the action taken by the court of
appeals in Shamblin's, focusing on the doctrine of remittitur and the limitations
imposed upon courts by the seventh amendment. The Note explains why
Shamblin's was not supported by Tull, the principal authority upon which the
Fourth Circuit relied, and describes the Shamblin's court's departure from the
traditional allocation of duties between judge and jury. The Note concludes that
the judicial overreaching in Shamblin's is an unjustified and unwarranted assault
on the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury.5
In 1984 plaintiff Shamblin's Ready Mix, Inc. ("Shamblin's"), a West Vir-
ginia company, purchased a motor and pump for a paddle-wheel boat from Scott
Equipment Company ("Scott"), a West Virginia distributor for an Ohio manu-
facturer, the Eaton Corporation ("Eaton"). 6 The equipment malfunctioned, and
Shamblin's returned it to Scott for replacement under the manufacturer's war-
1. 873 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 742-43.
3. 481 U.S. 412 (1987). In Tull the United States Supreme Court held that although a litigant
is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of liability for civil penalties, the jury right does not extend to
the assessment of penalties. Id. at 427; see infra text accompanying notes 79-95.
4. Shamblin 's, 873 F.2d at 742-43.
5. The seventh amendment provides that "[iln suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
6. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 738.
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ranty.7 Scott informed Shamblin's that the fault in the equipment was unrelated
to materials or workmanship and, therefore, the warranty covered neither re-placement nor repair. 8 Without consulting Shamblin's, Scott then shipped the
equipment to Eaton for further warranty consideration.9
Shamblin's, insisting on replacement and threatening to bring suit, repeat-
edly demanded the return of its unrepaired equipment.10 Scott informed
Shamblin's that it had shipped the equipment to Ohio and that Eaton agreed
that the warranty did not cover the problems." Eaton offered to repair and
return the equipment with a new warranty at a cost of $2,069.12 Shamblin's
again demanded the return of the equipment.13 Scott informed Shamblin's that
due to its threat to bring a lawsuit, Eaton refused to return the equipment unre-
paired and was awaiting Shamblin's authorization of repairs at the stated
price. 14 Eaton continued to disregard demands for the return of the equipment,
and Shamblin's filed suit for conversion against both Scott and Eaton. 15
In the district court, a jury awarded $3,531 in compensatory damages and
$600,000 in punitive damages. 16 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the compensatory award but set aside the punitive
award, finding it tainted by the "improper and highly prejudicial" closing argu-
ment delivered by counsel for plaintiff Shamblin's. 17 The court of appeals re-
manded for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. 18
On remand the jury awarded Shamblin's punitive damages in the amount of
$650,000.19 When the case reached the court of appeals for the second time,
that court again found the punitive damages award grossly excessive, the "prod-
uct of erroneously admitted evidence and misleading argument."' 20 Defendant
urged the appeals court to set aside the $650,000 punitive damages verdict and
determine an appropriate punitive award.21 Plaintiff Shamblin's opposed the
denial of a new trial, asserting that such a denial would violate its seventh
7. Id. Initially Scott offered to pick up and repair the equipment free of charge. Shamblin's
refused the offer and demanded replacement of the faulty equipment. Scott then withdrew its offer
of free repair. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Before answering the complaint, Eaton contacted Shamblin's with an unconditional
offer to return the unrepaired equipment. Shamblin's refused the offer. Id.
16. See id. at 737.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 739. A former Scott employee testified that Eaton's refusal to return the unrepaired
equipment was in accordance with company policy. Id. The attorney for Shamblin's based his
closing argument on this testimony, which the appellate court determined had been admitted errone-
ously into evidence because the witness had no personal knowledge of Eaton's policies. Id.
21. Id. at 739-40.
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amendment right to a jury trial.22 The court of appeals ruled for defendant
Eaton and declined to remand the case for a third jury trial, reasoning that the
Constitution does not require that a jury determine the amount of punitive dam-
ages. 23 The court determined $60,000 to be an appropriate punitive award and
entered judgment for that amount. 24
In setting aside the jury verdict and substituting its own calculation of dam-
ages, the Fourth Circuit proposed a new theory of the jury's role in the determi-
nation of remedies. The court of appeals extrapolated from a United States
Supreme Court case, Tull v. United States,2 5 the broad proposition that the sev-
enth amendment jury right attaches to the question of liability for damages but
does not extend to the assessment of damages. 26
Traditionally, courts have determined the scope of the seventh amendment
right to trial by jury by reference to the common-law rules existing at the time of
the amendment's adoption in 1791.27 At common law the right to a jury at-
tached only to those actions considered legal in nature; actions in equity or ad-
miralty did not afford the right to a jury.28 Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the seventh amendment applies to "action[s] in-
volv[ing] rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in... action[s] at
law.",29
In 1791 juries, not judges, determined awards of punitive damages, 30 and
modem cases have held the assessment of damages to be "peculiarly within the
province of the jury."' 3 1 The United States Supreme Court has held that a claim
for actual and punitive damages is "the traditional form of relief offered in the
courts of law" and thus requires a jury trial upon demand. 32
The fates of the doctrines of additur 33 and remittitur 34 under the seventh
22. Id. at 740.
23. Id. at 742-43.
24. Id. at 743. The court found this amount appropriate because of the absence of any personal
injury or property damage. The court also considered it significant that the willful retention of
plaintiff's equipment was due to defendant's effort to preserve it as evidence in light of plaintiff's
threat to bring suit. Id.
25. 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (litigant found liable for civil penalties by a jury does not have the right
to have the jury also determine the amount of the penalty); see infra text accompanying notes 79-95.
26. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 742. The court of appeals did not address the obvious question
why it remanded the case for a second jury trial on the punitive damages issue upon the first exces-
sive jury verdict if it was not necessary to do so.
27. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
28. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433, 446-47 (1830)).
29. Id. at 195. Thus, under the historical test of the seventh amendment, if an action existed at
the time the seventh amendment was adopted and the action afforded a right to a jury trial, that
action today also falls within the seventh amendment.
30. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763), is thoughtto be the first English case to award
punitive damages. A jury awarded three hundred pounds in an action for trespass and false impris-
onment. Id. For further discussion of the historic role of the jury as determiner of damages, see
Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915, 920-21 (W.D. Va. 1987).
31. Virginia M.R.R. v. White, 84 Va. 498, 508, 5 S.E. 573, 579 (1888); see also Ward v. White,
86 Va. 212, 219-21, 9 S.E. 1021, 1023-24 (1889) (damages award within strict province and discre-
tion ofjury).
32. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196.
33. The doctrine of additur allows a court to increase an inadequate jury award without re-
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amendment illustrate the jury's role as determiner of damages. The United
States Supreme Court has ruled that the seventh amendment does not permit
additur because additur would compel litigants to forgo the constitutional right
to the verdict of a jury.35 Further, the Supreme Court has limited the use of
remittitur to cases in which evidence does not support the damages awarded. 36
When evidence does not support the award, a court may order a new trial, or it
may condition the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial on a voluntary
remittance of part of the damages by the plaintiff.37 Application of the remitti-
tur doctrine is appropriate only when the jury has returned an excessive ver-
dict,38 and the plaintiff must be given the choice of submitting to a new trial on
the damages issue or of accepting the lesser amount chosen by the court. 39
In the landmark case Dimick v. Schiedt4° the United States Supreme Court
condemned the use of additur, but in dictum legitimized the use of remittitur in
federal courts. 41 In plaintiff's personal injury action, the jury returned a $500
verdict. 42 The trial court offered defendant the option of consenting to a $1000
additur, or in the alternative, accepting a new trial.4 3 Defendant consented to
the additur, and the court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial.44 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the trial court's
additur decision as a violation of the plaintiff's seventh amendment right to a
manding for ajury determination. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 35 (5th ed. 1979); see also Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935) (describing and condemning additur).
34. Remittitur is
the procedural process by which the verdict of a jury is diminished by subtraction.... The
term is used to describe generally any reduction made by the court without consent of the
jury; but the typical situation in which it is employed ... is where, on a motion by a
defendant for a new trial, the verdict is considered excessive and the plaintiff is given an
election to remit a portion of the amount or submit to a new trial.
Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 1 (1942).
35. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486-87.
36. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1889).
37. Id.
38. See Note, O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc.: An Improper Remittitur of a Punitive
Damages Award, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 288, 294 (1987); see also Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp.,
716 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 1983) (remittitur proper only when verdict "'so grossly excessive as to
shock the conscience of [the] court'" (quoting Drotzmann's, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d
830, 835 (8th Cir. 1974))); Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982) (remittitur on basis of
attorney misconduct improper when damages award not excessive).
39. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 479-84. The new trial option ensures the constitutionality of remit-
titur. If plaintiff accepts the remittitur and chooses not to accept the new trial, she has voluntarily
given up her right to a jury trial, and no seventh amendment issue exists. See id. at 474, 492-93
(Stone, J., dissenting); Kennon, 131 U.S. at 30; O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d
1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988); Higgins v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 716
F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1983); Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 136 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982); United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 258 F.2d 17, 31 (7th Cir.
1958) (court may not apply additur or remittitur without parties' consent, even in condemnation suit
in which parties have no constitutional right to a jury), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 328 (1959);
May v. Ellis Trucking Co., 243 F.2d 526, 526 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816
(1957).
40. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
41. See id. at 485.
42. Id. at 475.
43. Id. at 475-76.
44. Id. at 476.
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trial by jury.45 The United States Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals'
decision, agreeing that to allow the court to increase the verdict would "bring
the constitutional right of the plaintiff to a jury trial to an end in respect of a
matter of fact which no jury has ever passed upon."'4 6 In dictum, however, the
Court addressed the long-accepted practice of remittitur, a decrease in plaintiff's
damages award conditioned upon his rejecting the option of a new trial.4 7 Cit-
ing the uniform acceptance and application of the remittitur doctrine in the fed-
eral courts since Justice Story first applied it in 1822, the Dimick Court declared
it unlikely that a modem Court would reconsider or disturb the doctrine.48
The United States Supreme Court held in Kennon v. Gilmer49 that, except
for the limited power to order remittitur when plaintiff elects to remit rather
than face a new trial, a court has no power to replace a damages verdict assessed
by a jury with its own assessment of what the damage amount should be.50
Plaintiff in Kennon brought an action in a Montana district court against a com-
mon carrier for negligent operation of a stagecoach resulting in plaintiff's inju-
ries.5 1 The jury returned a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of
$20,750.52 Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana, which
found the award unsupported by the evidence.5 3 The supreme court affirmed
the verdict as to liability, but reduced the damages award to $10,750, believing
the award amount to be tainted by passion and prejudice.5 4 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that in replacing the jury's assessment of dam-
45. Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F.2d 558, 562 (1st Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
46. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486.
47. Id. at 484. The Court observed that if the question of remittitur then had been before it for
the first time, the doctrine likely would have been condemned. Id.
48. Id. at 484-85 (citing Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761-62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578)
(Story, J.)). The Dimick Court endorsed the application of remittitur under certain circumstances:
Where the verdict returned by a jury is palpably and grossly inadequate or excessive, it
should not be permitted to stand; but, in that event, both parties remain entitled, as they
were in the first instance, to have a jury properly determine the question of liability and the
extent of injury by an assessment of damages. Both are questions of fact.
Id. at 486. Remittitur is rarely used and is not appropriate if the verdict is found to be the result of
passion or prejudice, because prejudice may have affected the jury's decision on liability as well as
damages. I1 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 103
(1973). In such cases it is not enough to require a remittitur as a condition of the verdict's being
allowed to stand.
Involved in the verdict is the finding on the hotly contested question of liability as well as
the question of damages; and the fact that the jury rendered a verdict for damages which
the court found unreasonable and grossly excessive [is] a matter impeaching the fitness of
the verdict with respect to both questions.
Ford Motor Co. v. Mahone, 205 F.2d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 1953); see also Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault
Ste. Marie Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521 (1931) (verdict found to be the result of jury passion
and prejudice cannot stand because appeals to jury passion "may be quite as effective to beget a
wholly wrong verdict as to produce an excessive one"); Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. F. R. Hoar & Son, Inc., 370 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1967) (if excessive verdict is result of passion,
prejudice, or caprice, remittitur is improper).
49. 131 U.S. 22 (1889).
50. Kennon, 131 U.S. at 29.
51. Id. at 22-23.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id.
54. Id. The district court had denied defendant's motion for a change of venue on the ground
that plaintiff could not obtain an impartial trial in his home county. Id. at 23.
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ages with its own the Supreme Court of Montana had acted beyond its constitu-
tional authority. 55 The Montana court had the discretion to deny the motion for
a new trial, to grant it generally, or to order that a new trial be had unless the
plaintiff chose to remit part of the verdict.5 6 The territorial appeals court did
not, however, have the authority to usurp the seventh amendment and reexam-
ine the facts in ruling on the motion for a new trial. 57 Under Kennon, therefore,
the court may remit part of the judgment only if the plaintiff is given the option
of a new trial; a court that does otherwise acts beyond its authority.58
A more recent case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reiterated the principles enunciated in Kennon and Dimick. In Scott v.
Plante59 a jury awarded $15,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in puni-
tive damages to plaintiff, an involuntary patient at a psychiatric hospital.60
Plaintiff, previously found not competent to stand trial for the murder of his
grandmother, brought suit claiming that his confinement without treatment vio-
lated his fifth amendment due process right.6 1 The federal district court judge
deemed the jury's award excessive and reduced it to nominal damages of one
dollar.62 The court did not offer plaintiff the option of a new trial.63 The Third
Circuit reversed, reasoning that the trial court had acted beyond its powers and
had violated plaintiff's seventh amendment right.64
In a highly publicized 1987 case, a federal judge used punitive damages as
leverage to induce corrective action by a defendant. In O'Gilvie v. International
Playtex, Inc.65 Judge Patrick Kelly, a federal district judge in Kansas, reduced a
jury's punitive damage assessment from $10 million to $1.35 million in a toxic
shock syndrome product liability case.66 In return for the reduction, defendant
55. Id. at 28-29. At the time of Kennon, Montana was only a territory and not yet a state. Id.
at 22. The United States Supreme Court observed that the seventh amendment was "in full force in
Montana, as in all other organized territories of the United States." Id. at 28 (citing Act of May 26,
1864, ch. 95, § 13, 13 Stat. 91). Although United States territories are bound by the federal rule,
states are not. The seventh amendment is not binding on the states and therefore applies only in
federal courts. See Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. Ray. 669,
670-71 (1918). Most state constitutions, however, provide for a right to jury trials in certain cases.
Id.
56. Kennon, 131 U.S. at 29; see also Note, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM.
L. REv. 299, 310 (1976) (appellate court, upon determination that damages award is excessive, may
remand for a new trial or may deny a new trial conditioned upon plaintiff's acceptance of remittance
of part of award).
57. Kennon, 131 U.S. at 29.
58. Id.
59. 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982).
60. Id. at 120-24.
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id. at 136.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889)). The court distinguished the case before
it from a case in which the amount of damages is a matter of undisputed calculation. Id. at 136-37;
see e-g., Garfield Aniline Works v. Zendle, 43 F.2d 537, 538 (3d Cir. 1930) (in action based on
contract, where excess can be ascertained readily, court may reduce verdict to proper amount).
Presumably, courts have the power to correct simple mathematical errors made by juries.
65. 609 F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.
1987),.cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988).
66. Id. at 820.
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ceased sale of its super-absorbent tampon and undertook a preventive educa-
tional campaign. 67 Although some commentators have applauded Judge Kelly's
actions as fulfilling the dual purposes of punitive damages, 68 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit rejected his innovative attempt at bargaining and
reversed.69 The appellate court held that the trial court erred in reducing the
amount of the punitive award, because the defendant's promised amelioration on
which the remittitur was based was irrelevant to the injury underlying the plain-
tiff's punitive damages claim.70 Even if the case had been a proper one for the
use of remittitur,71 the court observed that
in an ordinary remittitur case, the plaintiff must be offered a choice
between a new trial and accepting a remittitur to avoid a serious prob-
lem under the Seventh Amendment, which reserves to the jury the de-
termination of damages. 72
The appellate court, citing Kennon, restated the rule that the seventh amend-
ment prohibition on intruding into the jury sphere limits a court's power to
exercise remittitur.73
In McKinnon v. City of Berwyn 74 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that although a judge can set aside an excessive jury
verdict, he may fix the proper level of damages himself only if the plaintiff is
entitled to a specific amount of damages as a matter of law, as where a fixed sum
is specified by statute as liquidated damages.75 In McKinnon, a civil rights ac-
tion, the trial judge granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to two de-
fendants and remitted part of the jury's punitive damage award against a third
defendant. 76 The appellate court reversed as to the remittitur, holding that the
court may fix damage awards in cases in which an amount is set as a matter of
law, but in cases in which the amount of damages depends on the specifics of the
case, the "proper corrective is to give [the plaintiff] the choice ...between
accepting the remittitur and.., a new trial on the damages."'77 The McKinnon
court determined that denying plaintiff the option of a new trial when remitting
67. Id. at 819. Judge Kelly did not label his action a remittitur, but described his form of
judicial bargaining as "an innovative remedy geared to what the court reasoned as 'that which ought
to be.'" Id. at 818.
68. See Prentice, Reforming Punitive Damages: The Judicial Bargaining Concept, 7 REV. Li-
TIG. 113, 148-63 (1988); Comment, Remedial Activism: Judicial Bargaining With Punitive Damage
Awards, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 941, 952-58 (1986). Punitive damages are intended to punish the
wrongdoer as well as to deter future instances of the same conduct. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2.01-2.13 (1985); Ervin, Punitive Damages in North
Carolina, 59 N.C.L. REv. 1255, 1256 (1982).
69. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1450 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988).
70. Id.
71. Remittitur was not proper because the trial judge did not find the amount of the award
excessive. Id. at 1448-49.
72. Id. at 1447 (citing Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889)).
73. Id.
74. 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984).
75. Id. at 1392.
76. Id. at 1385.
77. Id. at 1392.
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punitive damages was improper and violated the seventh amendment.78
Despite the abundance of authority recognizing the jury's role as deter-
miner of damages, the United States Supreme Court recently observed in a foot-
note that "[n]othing in the [Seventh] Amendment's language suggests that the
right to a jury trial extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial."'79 In 1987 the
Court decided Tull v. United States,80 a case in which the government sought
civil penalties and injunctions under the Clean Water Act 8' against a real estate
developer who had dumped fill into wetlands illegally.8 2 The government con-
tended that an action for civil penalties is equitable in nature and under the
historical test of the seventh amendment 83 does not afford a litigant the right to
trial by jury.84 The Tull Court disagreed, however, concluding that the penal-
ties authorized by the Clean Water Act were intended to be punitive rather than
restitutional, yielding "a type of remedy at common law that could only be en-
forced at courts of law."'85 After characterizing civil penalties as both punitive
and legal, the Court reasoned that the developer was entitled to have a jury
determine whether he was liable for penalties.86
The Tull Court then addressed the issue of whether the developer also was
entitled to a jury determination of the penalty amount.87 Here the Court aban-
doned the historical test and adopted a delegation theory to uphold the power of
a court to calculate civil penalties.88 After examining the legislative history of
the Clean Water Act, the Court determined that Congress intended that trial
judges perform the necessary calculations after juries determine initial liability
for civil penalties. Further, the Court held that Congress can delegate to judges
its own authority to calculate and assess civil penalties, 8 9 and that such delega-
tion is not inconsistent with the seventh amendment.90 The Court quoted its
opinion in Galloway v. United States:91 "'[T]he [Seventh] Amendment was
designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamen-
tal elements.' "92 Because Congress had predetermined the amount of recovery
by statute, the Court found that "[t]he assessment of penalties.., cannot be said
78. Id.
79. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 n.9 (1987).
80. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982). The statute does not state explicitly whether trial judges or juries
are to make the calculations necessary to assess civil penalties. See id.
82. Tull, 481 U.S. at 414.
83. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
84. Tull, 481 U.S. at 418-25.
85. Id. at 422.
86. Id. at 423. The Court applied the historical seventh amendment test. See supra notes 27-29
and accompanying text (describing the test).
87. Tull, 481 U.S. at 425-27.
88. Id. at 426-27.
89. Id. at 427. The Court noted that Congress' authority to assess civil penalties was not in
question, and "[s]ince Congress itself may fix the civil penalties, it may delegate that determination
to trial judges." Id.
90. Id.
91. 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (upholding the court's authority to direct a verdict when offered evi-
dence is insufficient to raise a question of fact for the jury).
92. Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (quoting Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392).
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to involve.., a 'fundamental element of a jury trial.' ,,93 The Tull Court thus
concluded that notwithstanding the right to a jury trial on the question of liabil-
ity, the right does not extend to the phase of the trial during which civil penalties
are calculated. 94 In cases in which penalties are established by law, there is no
need for jury involvement; courts may calculate the appropriate penalty
themselves. 95
Contrary to the limitations of remittitur and extensive precedent regarding
application of the doctrine,96 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Shamblin's reduced the jury's punitive damages award without offer-
ing plaintiff Shamblin's the option of a new trial.97 The Shamblin's court erro-
neously interpreted Tull broadly to hold that the right to a jury trial does not
extend to the remedy phase of a trial.9 8 A narrower reading of Tull would rec-
ognize that its holding rested on the delegation theory and, absent this theory,
the Tull Court would have reached the opposite result. Because there is no such
congressional determination or delegation of authority to determine punitive
awards, it is improper to apply Tull's reasoning to the facts of Shamblin's. Pu-
nitive awards are determined by reference to the particular facts of the case
before the court, taking into consideration such factors as the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct and the extent of harm. 99 Because the calculation of punitive
damages occurs on a case-by-case basis, rather than by congressional predeter-
mination, the Court's reasoning in Tull regarding the calculation of fixed penal-
ties is inapplicable to fact-based determinations of the appropriate amounts of
punitive damages.1° ° A court has power to determine only questions of law;
93. Id. (quoting Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392).
94. Id. at 427.
95. Id. at 426. The Court noted that the action to recover civil penalties usually seeks the
amount fixed by Congress. Id.
96. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
97. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 743. The Shamblin's court did not label its action remittitur. See
infra note 118. In support of its action, the Shamblin's court cited three pre-Tull cases in which
appellate courts reduced excessive jury verdicts rather than remanding the damages issues for jury
determinations. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 740-41. The court cited Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
832 F.2d 194, 207 (1st Cir. 1987) ("remanding a case under such circumstances serves no useful
purpose"); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984) (punitive award reduced
to amount commensurate with amounts awarded against other parties in same case); and Guzman v.
Western State Bank, 540 F.2d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 1976) (appellate court can reduce "unfair and
shocking" jury punitive damage award).
As the Shamblin 's court noted, neither Rowlett, Guzman, nor Bell discusses the seventh amend-
ment. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 741. Nor do these cases discuss Kennon. The courts did not consider
the doctrine of remittitur, but simply reduced the damages, without discussing whether they had the
authority to do so. In the same year the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
decided Bell, it decided MeKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984), in which it
held that before remitting part of a verdict, the judge must offer the plaintiff the option of a new trial.
Id. at 1391-92. McKinnon did not mention Bell.
98. No court has interpreted Tull as broadly as the Fourth Circuit interpreted it in Shamblin's.
A number of controversial district court decisions have addressed Tull's applicability to the consti-
tutionality of legislative caps on damages. For an example of the confusion surrounding Tull's rele-
vance to damages determination, see the Boyd litigation: Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D.
Va. 1986), reconsideration denied, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987), rev'd in relevant part, 877 F.2d
1191 (1989); Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989) (declining to follow
Boyd); Reuwer v. Hunter, 684 F. Supp. 1340 (W.D. Va. 1988) (refusing to reconsider Boyd).
99. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.5 (1980).
100. To justify its reliance on Tull, the Shamblin's court relied on a footnote in the Tull opinion
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damages fall within that category only when they are fixed by statute, as with
statutory liquidated damages 0 1 or civil penalties, or when the amount of dam-
ages is a matter of undisputed calculation. 10 2
The Shamblin's court virtually ignored the Tull Court's explanation of the
delegation theory and instead relied on a footnote to the Tull opinion, in which
the Court remarked that "[n]othing in the [Seventh] Amendment's language
suggests that .... the Framers meant to extend the right to a jury to the remedy
phase of a civil trial."' 1 3 It is clear from the Tull opinion, however, that the
Court's holding rested not on this dicta but on the delegation theory. 104 Fur-
thermore, although evidence of the Framers' intent to extend the jury trial right
to the remedy phase was missing, certainly American jurisprudence and the
Supreme Court itself have long interpreted the right to extend thus. 105 Indeed,
there is no historical justification for distinguishing the jury's role in the liability
and remedy phases of a trial of a common-law action.10 6 In Tull, the theory
that noted the similarity between punitive damages and civil penalties. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 741
(citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 422 n.7). The footnote passage quoted discusses the two remedies only in
terms of the legal/equitable characterization. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422 n.7. It does not provide a
basis for the Shamblin's court's conclusion that "[t]here is no principled distinction between civil
penalties and the modem concept of punitive damages." Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 742. In a recent
case more directly confronting the issue, the United States Supreme Court found civil penalties and
punitive damages so dissimilar that it held that the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment
does not apply to punitive damage assessments. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal Inc.,
109 S. Ct. 2909, 2920 (1989); infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
101. See McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984); supra text accompa-
nying notes 74-78. The Shamblin's court asserted that the measure of damages is a matter of law for
the court to decide, rather than a question of fact for the jury. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 742. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has held otherwise. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
486 (1935) (both liability issue and assessment of damages are questions of fact). It is true that the
measure of damages, that is, the factors to be considered when calculating the damages, is a question
of law.
Whether the facts of a given case will allow an award of punitive damages to be made by
the jury is originally a question of law for the judge to decide. Once the issue of punitive
damages is submitted to the jury, it has the discretion to decide if such damages are
recoverable.
K. REDDEN, supra note 99, at § 3.4(A). But the proper amount of punitive damages, the calculation
of which is based on the unique fact situation of a particular case, is a question of fact. The
Shamblin's court, sitting in diversity, applied the substantive law of West Virginia in allowing puni-
tive damages, which "requires consideration of 'all the circumstances surrounding the particular
occurrence including the nature of the wrongdoing, the extent of harm inflicted, the intent of the
party committing the act, the wealth of the perpetrator, as well as any mitigating circumstances.'"
Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 738 (quoting Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 878 (W. Va. 1982)). Accord-
ing to one appellate court,
[t]he allowance of [punitive] damages inherently involves an evaluation of the nature of the
conduct in question, the wisdom of some form of pecuniary payment, and the advisability
of a deterrent. Therefore, the infliction of such damages, and the amount thereof inflicted,
are of necessity within the discretion of the trier of fact.
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970).
102. See supra note 64.
103. Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 n.9.
104. See id. at 426-27.
105. "If the Court has [the] authority [to determine punitive damages], the right to a jury trial
...is little more than an empty gesture. The jury is stripped of the factfinding characteristics
inherent in the traditional jury trial and its function becomes nothing more than advisory." United
States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 258 F.2d 17, 31 (7th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 328
(1959).
106. Justice Scalia's dissent in Tull observed the lack of historical precedent for such a distinc-
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that Congress may delegate its penalty-assessing authority to the courts-a the-
ory completely divorced from any analysis of the historical allocation of the fact-
finding function to the jury-justified the distinction between the liability and
remedy phases of a trial. Delegation, however, may occur only if Congress has
the authority to determine penalties and does so by statute. Tull's delegation
theory cannot possibly justify the distinction between the liability and remedy
phases when trying a claim, such as in Shamblin's, that existed at common
law. 107
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc. 108 further weakens the Shamblin's court's interpretation of Tull.
In Kelco the Court held that the excessive fines clause does not apply to punitive
damage awards in cases between private parties. 109 The Court distinguished a
punitive damage award between private parties from a "fine," the latter histori-
cally defined as "a payment to a sovereign for some offense."' 110 One modem
equivalent of a fine by the sovereign is the statutorily imposed civil penalty.III
The Court's holding that punitive damages should not receive the same constitu-
tional treatment as government-imposed penalties undermines the Shamblin's
court's reliance on Tull in the punitive damage context.
If the Shamblin's court's broad interpretation of Tull was accurate, then
Tull overruled Kennon v. Gilmer.112 Tull did not purport to do so. Indeed the
Shamblin's court did not read Tull as overruling Kennon, but felt compelled to
distinguish Kennon in order to reach Tull.113 The Shamblin's court distin-
guished its own reduction of a damages award from that of the Supreme Court
of Montana in Kennon based on the difference in the purposes of punitive dam-
ages and compensatory damages.1 14 The "marked difference ' 1-5 between the
tion. According to Justice Scalia, there is "no precedent for judgment of civil liability by jury but
assessment of amount by the court.... Even punitive damages are assessed by the jury when liability
is determined in this fashion." Tull, 481 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Such a
division is even less justifiable outside of the Tull context when factfinding is necessary to the
determination.
107. "Litigating an entire case with the understanding that the jury is going to determine the
punitive damages award and, after that award is established, unilaterally and arbitrarily usurping the
jury's discretion is an improper invasion of the jury's function." Note, supra note 38, at 301-02.
108. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). Kelco was an antitrust case in which defendant challenged a deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upholding a jury award of $6
million in punitive damages. See id. at 2913. Defendant argued that the size of the award violated
the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment. See id. The Court held that the excessive fines
clause was intended to place limits on the powers of the federal government; it was not concerned
with "the extent or purposes of civil damages." Id. at 2915.
109. Id. at 2920.
110. Id. at 2915.
111. See Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa 296, 300-01 (Clarke 1856) (fines include money recov-
ered in a civil suit that is paid to the government); Hanscomb v. Russell, 77 Mass. 373, 375 (1858)
(same); 36A C.J.S. Fines § 1 (1961).
112. 131 U.S. 22 (1889); see supra text accompanying notes 49-58 (discussing Kennon). The
Shamblin's court apparently also read Tull as overruling Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), see
supra text accompanying notes 40-48; O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438 (10th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988), see supra text accompanying notes 65-73; and Mc-
Kinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984), see supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
113. See Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 741.
114. Id.
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two types of damages persuaded the court that it need not heed Kennon.116 Yet
the Kennon Court in no way limited its holding to punitive damage awards, but
clearly stated that
no court of law, upon a motion for a new trial for excessive damages
and for insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, is author-
ized according to its own estimate of the amount of damages which the
plaintiff ought to have recovered, to enter an absolute judgment for
any other sum than that assessed by the jury.1 17
The Shamblin's court's distinguishing of Kennon is therefore unpersuasive. Be-
cause Tull was not dispositive of a litigant's entitlement to a jury trial on the
amount of punitive damages, the Shamblin's court was bound by Kennon, which
requires that remittitur be exercised properly or not at all. t 18
The Shamblin's court's application of the Tull holding to a punitive dam-
ages case gives a reviewing court power beyond its discretion. An appellate
court may "modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment... brought before
it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate
judgment ... or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under
the circumstances." '1 19 The appellate court has a wide range of options from
which it may choose. The case law, exemplified by Kennon, is clear, however,
that arbitrarily reducing (or increasing) a jury determination of damages is not
115. Id.
116. Id. The Shamblin's court interpreted Kennon to apply only to compensatory damage
awards, and because Shamblin's concerned the reduction of a punitive award, the court concluded
that it was not bound by Kennon. The Shamblin's court reasoned that punitive damages serve a
public purpose rather than serving to make the plaintiff whole. Id. Punitive damages, said the court,
are "'private fines levied by civil juries.'" Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
350 (1974)). But see supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (punitive damages are not the
equivalent of civil penalties).
117. Kennon, 131 U.S. at 29.
118. Id. at 29-30. The Shamblin's court, however, did not profess to be applying remittitur.
Although clearly the court's action was based in part upon an efficiency rationale and its belief that a
third jury trial would be wasteful, see Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 742, there are at least two additional
reasons why the court did not label its action remittitur. First, remittitur was improper in
Shamblin's because the court found the verdict to be the result of erroneously admitted testimony
and a prejudicial closing argument. See id. at 739; supra note 48 (noting cases holding remittitur
improper if excessive award is due to jury passion).
Another possible reason that the court did not profess to apply remittitur is the restrictiveness
of the doctrine in West Virginia. West Virginia law does not allow remittitur unless there is data
before the court by which the amount of the excess may be ascertained definitively. Earl T. Brow-
der, Inc. v. County Court of Webster County, 145 W. Va. 696, 701, 116 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1960);
D.D. Cox & Co. v. Carter Coal Co., 81 W. Va. 555, 557, 94 S.E. 956, 957 (1918); T.J. Flanagan v.
Flanagan Coal Co., 77 W. Va. 757, 759, 88 S.E. 397, 398 (1918). Professors Wright and Miller state
a similar rule:
Except in those cases in which it is apparent as a matter of law that certain identifiable
sums included in the verdict should not have been there, the court may not arbitrarily
reduce the amount of damages, for to do so would deprive the parties of their constitu-
tional right to a jury.
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2815, at 95 (1973) (footnote
omitted).
Nevertheless, even when the court does not profess to be applying the remittitur doctrine, if the
action it takes amounts to a de facto application of the doctrine, the same constitutional standard
must apply. See O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1447-50 (10th Cir. 1987),
cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988) (discussed supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982).
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one of those options. 120
The appellate role is not to reexamine the facts of the case, but to review the
trial court's determination of whether the verdict is within the confines set by
state law under an abuse of discretion standard. 12 1 The appellate judge has only
a written record of the trial before him and is not well-qualified to determine if a
jury verdict is excessive. 122 When a court reduces a jury's determination of
damages, whether compensatory or punitive, absent consent by the parties, it is
necessarily reexamining the facts of the case. If the jury determination was im-
proper, the appellate court has several options. The court can remand for a
complete new trial, or for a trial on the issue of damages. 123 If a court chooses
to remit part of the jury verdict, it is bound to apply the remittitur, doctrine with
the restrictions placed upon it by the Supreme Court in Dimick v. Schiedt 124 and
reaffirmed by the Court in Kennon v. Gilmer.125
The Shamblin's court's reluctance, after two excessive jury verdicts, to re-
mand for a third jury trial on the issue of punitive damages is understandable.
Nevertheless, the jury and its role as the finder of fact is of such importance in
our jurisprudence that any intrusion into the jury realm must be scrutinized
strictly. 126 When a court usurps the jury role as the Shamblin's court did, the
resulting verdict is "'an assessment partly made by a jury which has acted im-
properly and partly made by a tribunal which has no power to assess.' "127
Neither the plaintiff nor the jury should be blamed for excessive verdicts; more
specific jury instructions and guidelines and legislative caps or formulas for cal-
culating punitive damages 128 are effective methods for preventing excessive ver-
dicts before the fact. An excessive jury verdict, or even two or three of them,
cannot justify usurpation of the jury role. The mandate of the seventh amend-
ment must override any questions of judicial efficiency or expediency.1 29 It is
120. See Kennon, 113 U.S. at 29; supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing Kennon).
121. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2922 (1989). Indeed, the
Supreme Court never has held expressly that the seventh amendment even allows appellate review of
a district court's denial of a motion to set aside an award as excessive. Id. at 2922 n.25.
122. See Note, supra note 56, at 304.
123. Because of the restrictiveness of the remittitur doctrine in West Virginia, remittitur was not
an option under the Shamblin's facts. See supra note 118.
124. 293 U.S. 474 (1935); see supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (discussing Dimick).
125. 131 U.S. 22 (1889); see supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing Kennon).
126. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,486 (1935); see also In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig.,
609 F.2d 411, 430 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Jurors, if properly instructed and treated with deserved respect,
bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their tasks."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929
(1980).
127. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 487 (quoting Barbour & Co. v. Deutsche Bank, [1919] A.C. 304, 335).
128. "[I]n view of the mandate of the Seventh Amendment, time might be better spent in search-
ing for ways to improve rather than erode the jury system." In re Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 432.
129. "[TIhe fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution." I.N.S.
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). "[Judges must remember that they have no general charge to
go about righting wrongs as knights errant might do." Prentice, supra note 68, at 135. Recall Judge
Kelly's claim that his overreaching was geared to what the court reasoned was "that which ought to
be." See supra note 67.
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clear that in Shamblin's, any benefits of the judicial intrusion into the realm of
the jury were outweighed by the resulting constitutional infringement.
CHRISTYNO L. HAYES
